If you are using Windows CTRL+ALT+Right Arrow will rotate your screen
If you are using Windows CTRL+ALT+Right Arrow will rotate your screen
Dairon Blanco (OF) – An under the radar Cuban signee from last December, the 24-year-old may be a quick mover through the Athletics system. In my viewings he played center field and had excellent ABs against quality competition. On 3/7, he faced Blake Treinen and Chris Hatcher, both of whom allowed doubles to Blanco. He has shown an ability to protect the zone/lay off major league caliber breaking pitches and a quick stroke that should limit his strikeouts. His swing is simple, short and there is no wasted motion. It is fairly linear and his BP did not reveal much power, but I am came away impressed regardless. It is worth noting, in 2015/2016 his final season in Cuba’s Serie Nacional, Blanco only struck out in 11.29% of his plate appearances despite being 6.6 years younger than the average age. Speed is also a big part of Blanco’s game. I clocked him 4.24 seconds home to first on a double. A straight home to first of 4.25 from the right side is above average speed. Considering my time was on a turn, it’s 65 bordering on 70 speed. More viewings are needed to determine defense/arm grades, but Blanco the hitter appears capable of rapid ascent through the minors. I am curious to see where Oakland starts him.
Nick Allen (SS) – Small of stature, large of #want, the Athletics 2017 3rd round pick is listed at 5’9″ 155 which may be generous height-wise. I bumped into his H.S. English teacher, Nancy, and her son Jake who lauded Allen’s work ethic and unassuming nature. On the field, Allen looked like a potential starting shortstop. Defense will carry his profile. He’s quick and has good range. Infield actions were smooth. The arm is a 60. I do not have qualms over his ability to stick at the position. At the plate, his hands are quiet and his bat is quick through the zone. There is good bat control here as well as Allen displayed a propensity to foul off two-strike pitches and stay alive. In two viewings, he had three 10+ pitch ABs. Lack of loft in his swing and Allen’s physique limit his power potential, which should result in pitchers challenging him in the zone. He will have to prove he can make hard contact consistently enough to punish them. Given the aforementioned bat control and above average bat speed, I think he can. I see a ceiling of a second-division regular and a utility-infielder floor, but I am bullish on his chances of reaching his ceiling.
Lazaro Armenteros (OF) – One of the biggest names of 2016’s J2 signing period, Lazarito signed with the Athletics for $3MM. In A’s camp he displayed some tools that made him a coveted free agent, including 60 speed and above average raw power. Conversely, there were some concerning trends, notably off-balance swings versus breaking pitches. Armenteros does not appear to track breaking balls well out of the opposing pitcher’s hand. At times, his hips rotated early and his hands were left back, flailing at the ball. I was also not into his arm. In the 3/7 intrasquad, there was below average arm strength and discernible arc/poor carry on what should have been a max effort throw. I don’t want to kill him for these flaws. It’s easy to forget how young he is; 2018 will be his age 19 season. Still, they are concerning trends that should be monitored in his first exposure to full-season ball this year.
Miguel Romero (RHP) – This past fall I saw Romero five times in the Arizona Fall League and didn’t make much of him. In fact, I seemed baffled by what exactly he was throwing.
My abridged notes:
10/13 – 91-92, 79 CB?
10/17 – 90-91 (2 seam), 95-96 (4 seam), SL 82-84
10/26 – Loose arm, 91, 83?
11/2 – 92-94 SL 84-87 will pitch in on RHH
11/16 – 89-92 (easy) 79 CB
After seeing him twice this spring and overhearing Oakland’s coaches, I was able to understand my confusion. Romero throws a knuckle change in the 79-81 range. I have seen it move to either side with plus depth. Spin rate numbers were in the 900-1080 range for the pitch, which makes sense. Knuckleballs are notorious for having little spin. Those who frequent Baseball Savant spreadsheets will recognize these figures as being exceptionally low. For some context, the average fastball spin rate was around 2250 rpm and the average curve spin rate was around 2500 rpm (2017 figures). The pitch was jokingly referred to as “El Tigre”. Isn’t that cute? It was pretty nasty when commanded.
Romero also sat 94-95 and touched 96, which was an uptick from what I had typically seen in the AFL. The slider is a solid 60 when it’s on. It was 86-88 with nasty glove-side action in this viewing. The pure stuff is very good but the arsenal as a whole plays down due to command. From the looks of Romero’s Baseball Reference page, he appears to be a guy on the fast track for the bullpen. Oakland started him in the DSL in 2017 and moved him with a hop, skip and jump to the CAL league by season’s end. For a guy seemingly destined for the pen, Romero’s delivery is as easy as slicing fake butter with a katana. A part of me wishes they would give him a chance to start for that reason. Although I understand why Oakland would want to utilize him in a bullpen capacity.
Seven months ago I was perusing Amazon and daydreaming of improbable scenarios that might come back to haunt me. I was already the owner of a Canon Vixia HRF700 digital video recorder. The camera’s battery lasts a couple of hours and there is only around 30-60 minutes of recordable material in a given baseball game. I had never needed a spare battery but started running through Murphy’s Law scenarios in my mind. What if I forget to charge it? What if it gets damaged? What if it malfunctions? In an unprecedented move (for me), I did something I never normally have the foresight to do: plan for contingencies. Besides the battery was only $16. F*** it.
Last Friday, I was glad that I did. On Thursday night, I plugged in my Canon and went to bed with dreams of Ohtani sliders inducing ugly swings and misses. Ok, I made up the dream part, but the rest of this story is true. For whatever reason, my camera did not charge. After an ephemeral freak-out moment at the field, I remembered my spare battery. Worth every penny.
The B Squad scrimmage was slated to start at 10:00 AM. Chris Kusiolek (Twitter @calikusiolek) and I arrived early and claimed our seats behind home. This promised to be a mob scene, especially for normally docile B Squad standards. We were soon surrounded by a mix of Japanese media and domestic scouts. The high powered camera to person ratio was extremely high here. I’d estimate there were between 10 and 20 cameramen snapping rapid-fire action shots of Ohtani’s every move.
Let’s finish the background fluff and get to the good stuff. Were these videos cherry-picked? Of course. I don’t think that diminishes how good Ohtani’s stuff is and how excited we should be to see him pitch this year.
Fastball – 70
The fastball sat 92-94 and touched 96. My 70 grade is more based off his reported high 90s velocity. I suspect we are in the midst of a spring training ramping up phase. The fastball command was in the 55-60 range; It wasn’t elite but certainly better than average and maybe plus. He used it to both sides of the plate and expanded the zone on hitters with two strikes. Ohtani got some natural plane on the fastball due to his height, and he had the ability to run it armside out of the zone.
Slider – 70
Ohtani displayed advanced feel for his slider. He was able to use it to both sides of the plate. It’s worth noting, he was especially comfortable using it to the left side of the plate (batter perspective), whether back-dooring lefties or breaking it back inside on righties. Ranging from 80-85, it had extreme two-plane movement. Ohtani could use it in the zone early in counts or as a put away pitch below the zone with two strikes.
Splitter – 70
From all accounts the splitter is Ohtani’s go-to strikeout pitch. It was in the low 80s and dropped off the table. It enticed hitters into a couple of ugly swings and misses in this game. He used his slider more than the splitter in this outing which causes me to speculate whether he is “saving” his splitter for actual games in an attempt to limit opponent looks at it. Alternatively, have the Angels recommended a change to his pitch mix? I am unsure of the answer and am probably reading into it too much. It was only 2 2/3 innings in a spring training practice after all.
Curveball – 55
There were two or three curves thrown in the game. Ohtani was using it more as a change of pace offering within the zone. It had huge depth and a 12 to 6 shape. He would play with its velocity a bit and it ranged from 71-79. One was taken for a strike in the zone but left up, and I think a major league hitter would have taken advantage. Guys on this B squad were unable to make him pay for it. There was also a ball that slipped out of Ohtani’s hand a flew to the backstop. I believe that was his curve as well. Despite some inconsistency with it today it’s hard to overlook the massive movement on this pitch; I think it plays to above average.
Overall, it’s a nasty bevy of pitches. He didn’t even break out his changeup, which I have heard is a 50-grade pitch. It’s not unreasonable to think Ohtani will have three 70-grade pitches, assuming the fastball reaches its previous velocity. With regards to his overall command projection, Ohtani has long levers, but his body control and athleticism are phenomenal. I think his athleticism will enable him to touch 60 grade command as a whole.
Speaking of athleticism, the most underratedly impressive thing I saw him do was leap into the air and almost knock down this comebacker, a ball he had no business in getting a glove on. I think he’s going to be an elite defensive pitcher.
Like with any pitcher, health is an omnipresent concern and with Ohtani’s reported UCL sprain, there is even more risk. If he stays healthy, I see a player who could step in this year and be a number three starter. And it would not surprise me at all to see him produce at a number two level.
The Ohtani storyline will be a fun follow not only for Angels fans but for MLB fans across the country.
2/25/18 – Royals at Athletics (Hohokam Stadium)
AJ Puk was the big attraction here. He went two innings and showed why he has ace potential. His fastball sat comfortably 93-94, and the 88 mph slider looked untouchable. Seeing Puk for the first time was a treat. The body looks easily capable of starter’s workload. There is natural plus extension in his 6’7″ frame. His long arms result in a release point that is fairly high, in turn creating significant downhill plane on his offerings. Whether or not he can reach his OFP hinges on his changeup, a pitch that was thrown twice in Sunday’s outing. One fluttered out of the zone armside. The other looked league average. If Puk can refine his changeup command, he can be a number two starter.
Dustin Fowler returned to action for the first time since rupturing his patellar tendon last June. The savage injury occurred when he slammed into an unpadded wall while chasing down a foul ball. Fowler moved well in the outfield and on the bases, including a 4.17 home to first on a ground ball. While this isn’t Fowler’s max speed, it makes sense he would be ramping things up slowly in spring training, particularly after such a gruesome injury. If I had not previously known he was injured, nothing in this game would have stood out to me with regards to his mobility.
Royals RHP Andres Machado displayed plus momentum and an incredibly fast arm, touching 98 in the process. His 2015 season was wiped out due to TJ. He spent 2016, his age 23 season, in the Pioneer League where he was old for the level. That all changed in 2017 when the Royals pushed him aggressively. After 21 appearances in high A Wilmington, he received multiple promotions en route to his major league debut. The team liked him enough to add him to the 40-man roster last September. Expect Macado to be a contributor in the Royals pen this season.
Results-wise it wasn’t a good performance for Royals prospect Josh Staumont, but I can see why he has been a mainstay on Royals prospects lists the last few years. Frankly, it defies logic how he’s able to generate high 90s velocity with such an easy delivery. I am going to resort everyone’s favorite cliche’, he looks like he’s playing catch out there. This appearance did little to allay concerns over his mounting history of command issues. In 2016 he walked 7.6/9IP in 123 1/3 innings, and in 2017 he walked 7.00/9IP in 124 2/3 innings. These are not small sample sizes. In this outing, he was unable to locate his curveball with any consistency, although it flashed plus. Considering the ease of his delivery, I can see why the Royals would want to continue to develop him as a starter. 2018 may be a lost year for the Royals so it would behoove them to give Staumont another chance to figure things out.
2/26/18 – Mariners at Cubs (Sloan Field)
Unfortunately, the news du jour on Monday was King Felix getting hit in the forarm/elbow area with a comebacker. Luckily, It’s been reported the injury is not serious. Before leaving the game, Felix was 88-89 with his fastball and barely scrapped 90. His velo has been decreasing consistently over the years, and he averaged 91 last year according to Brooks Baseball. I would expect something similar from Felix this year. At this stage in his career he is a mid-rotation starter in my opinion. He is still a wizard with breaking pitches, but the unthreatening nature of his fastball curbs his ceiling.
Mariners 2017 1st round pick Evan White had two at bats in the game. As a prospect junkie, this was of immense interest to me. It’s hard to draw conclusions from two ABs, but I will say he did not look over-matched at all and appeared to have good strikezone awareness. White has been lauded as a plus-plus defender and some scouts are even advocating for a move to center field. This is an interesting guy to keep an eye on.
If you have not read my former post, 2017’s Most Aggressive Base Stealing Teams, I would recommend doing so before moving forward.
Much like the previous post, I am beginning my look at the least aggressive teams with a high-level inspection of their aggregate stolen base rates ((SB+CS)/SBO)). These figures were downloaded from Baseball Reference. Light red represents one standard deviation below average and dark red represents two STDs.
Baltimore was dead last each of the past three years! On its own that would not be worrisome, but in conjunction with their notorious aversion for foreign signees, it becomes a concern. The below link to Baseball America from last July sums it up. They were the only team to abstain from acquiring a single player during last year’s J2 International Singing Period. It has to make you question why are their practices are so abnormal relative to the other teams. This is a red flag.
Seeing Baltimore dead last three years in a row made me curious how the other four teams fared in previous seasons. It turns out the Mets, Athletics, and Blue Jays were fairly docile each year. I think it’s fair to expect the trend to continue going forward.
The Phillies, however, were average to aggressive in 2015-2016. Was 2017 an outlier? It’s hard to say. I took a look at how often individual players were sent the past three years to see if anything could be gleaned from it. For some reason the Phillies started running less with Galvis, Hernandez, Herrera, and Altherr. Hernandez had a poor success rate (56.67%) in 2016 so I can understand why his attempts were reduced. In my cursory, unthorough (is this even a word??) internet searches I found Herrera and Altherr both had leg injuries last year. Altherr’s was a hamstring tweak in mid-July, and Herrera went to the DL with a hamstring strain retroactive to mid-August. Alterr’s injury was pretty minor and Herrera didn’t miss time until the last six weeks of the season so neither of these seem explain the large declines in their attempt rates. I am stumped.
To learn more about the team-level stolen base attempt rates, let’s see how they compare to each team’s weighted average sprint speed. (SS Weighted Avs) Not too surprisingly, the teams that attempted the least steals on a rate basis also were among the slowest in the league. The exception was the Phillies who ranked 13th. This chart begs the question, which came first: the stolen base attempt rate or the sprint speed? I think the answer is the sprint speed. If teams do not put a high value on stealing bases it would probably start with the GM and players they chose to acquire. Looking at the four teams in question, this appears to be the case. Either way having slow guys on the roster is not going to incentivize teams to run.
Let’s take a look at each team’s stolen base attempt rates at a player-level to see if anything can be learned from them.
Baltimore Orioles – Whether right or wrong, Dan Duquette constructed their roster with a total apathy for speed. Only four players exceeded the average sprint speed mark of 27 ft/sec, although this is a bit deceiving because Machado, Mancini, Schoop, and Tejada were right around average. As a team, their weighted average sprint speed was third slowest in the majors. Adam Jones and Tim Beckham were probably capable of running more but were rarely sent. As long as the current regime is at the helm, don’t expect Orioles acquisitions to get many (or any) attempts unless they are burners. But it looks like Baltimore is averse to acquiring guys like that in the first place.
Oakland Athletics – Only Rajai Davis and Marcus Semien were sent at above average rates. The rest of the team didn’t steal. I was a bit surprised to see Matt Chapman highlighted as a plus runner (1 STD > AVE). He’s never been known as a base-stealer. It makes you wonder if he has a slow first step but fast max speed. Overall, it’s pretty clear Oakland does not place a high value on steals, but if they have a speed-oriented guy like Davis they will send him.
New York Mets – Four runners were sent less often than their sprint speeds might imply. If you are an Amed Rosario fantasy owner should you be concerned? At first glance his stolen base rate looks to be in line with his sprint speed. I wanted to check to see how his SB Att% compared to similar runners league-wide (within .2 ft/sec) and did so below. His SB Att% was smack in the middle of the seven player sample so I think it’s fair to say the Mets weren’t curtailing his attempts. Still, the Mets were non-aggressive as a whole.
Toronto Blue Jays – Another front office that does not care about speed, in fact, they were the slowest roster based on my weighted average sprint speed sheet. Richard Urena was the only player well above average. It’s worth noting, however, they were willing to send above average runners at rates in line with their speeds, they just didn’t employ many of them.
In totality, theses tables were not terribly enlightening. but if we can learn anything from them, non-aggressive teams are not a death knell for fast runners. Prolific base stealers will get their stolen bases regardless of organization.
In June of 2017, Baseball Savant introduced a new Statcast metric for public consumption. They defined sprint speed as “‘feet per second in a player’s fastest one-second window.’ The Major League average on a ‘max effort’ play is 27 ft/sec, and the max effort range is roughly from 23 ft/sec (poor) to 30 ft/sec (elite). A player must have at least 10 max effort runs to qualify for this leaderboard.”
Now that we have a year’s worth of data, and we are trapped in the middle of a cold, dark offseason, I thought it would be an opportune time to play around with it. Over the last few weeks I sliced, diced, and minced the numbers. One area explored was team sprint speed and its relationship to stolen base attempts. Sprint speed was pulled from the Baseball Savant Leaderboard and stolen base data was downloaded from Baseball Reference.
As a proxy for team aggressiveness I added team stolen bases to caught stealing and divided by stolen base opportunities (plate appearances through which a runner was on first or second with the next base open). SB Att% = (SB+CS)/SBO
The table above shows teams that sent runners most often in their SBOs each of the past three seasons. Light green represents one standard deviation above average and dark green denotes two standard deviations above average. One has to question how much these totals were the result of team aggressiveness and how much they were the result of team personnel. To check I took a weighted average of each player’s sprint speed by respective player’s plate appearances and then added to find team totals. SS=speed in the next table. If you’re curious to see the exact figures I attached my sheet here: SS Weighted Avs
Surprisingly, the 2017 Angels attempted steals at the highest rate despite being the second slowest team! The Brewers and Rangers were also quite aggressive despite their below average collective sprint speeds. The implication is these three teams had some sort of organizational edict to test defenses and attempt more steals. On the other hand, the Reds were the tenth fastest team. It’s also worth noting they were the only team to attempt steals at a plus rate (1 STD > AVE) each of the past three seasons.
To make more sense of the team-level numbers, I decided to get granular and look at them on a player level. First, I wanted to see how many players on each team attempted steals at a higher rate than the league average (5.17%), which you can see in the first column of the table below. Then, I wanted to see how many “not fast” players on each team attempted steals more than the league average rate. I did this by introducing a second filter, player sprint speed. The second and third columns show how many players per team were non-elite & below average runners but attempted steals more than the average rate.
For the purpose of this post I defined above average sprint speed as greater than 27 ft/sec and less than 28.3 ft/second. In the sample of 451 players on Baseball Savant’s Sprint Speed Leaderboard, 28.3 ft/sec was one standard deviation greater than average and 27 ft/sec was average. The middle column below shows eight Rangers, six Angels, and six Brewers attempted steals at a greater than average rate while having above average or worse speed. In other words, eight Rangers, six Angles, and six Brewers were non-elite runners but stole at a rate greater than league average anyway.
And they were not alone! My efforts monkeying around with filters and subtotals in Excel yielded this table. What does it tell us? Well for one, the Reds were not as aggressive sending runners as their overall SB Att% would suggest. Additionally, you could argue the Red Sox and Diamondbacks belong in the same conversation as the Angels, Brewers, and Rangers. They were willing to send a comparable number of non-elite runners at greater than league average rates.
While useful, this table is imperfect. Notably, it fails to account for magnitude of the SB Att%. In other words, it treats players who barely clear the league average threshold the same as players who are well above average.
The screenshots below display SB Att% by player for the five aforementioned teams plus Cincinnati. I highlighted SB Att% and sprint speed columns to add some meaning to the figures. It is intended to help visualize whether players attempted steals at a rate commensurate with their speed. The darker the green, the further from the mean. For example, Ryan Braun’s sprint speed cell is white (below average), but his SB Att% is green (over a standard deviation greater than average) so he attempted more steals than his sprint speed would suggest.
For those curious I attached my full spreadsheet. There are two tabs which show SS vs SB Att%: One for a sample of 451 and another for a sample of 491. The second tab adds extra lines for players who played for multiple teams. Sprint Speed vs SB Att%
I made observations on each of the six teams from the slideshow in the blurbs below:
Arizona Diamondbacks – Micro-level, Ketel Marte only attempted steals in 3.85% of his SBOs, a below average rate, despite ranking 29/451 in sprint speed. He should see an increase in his stolen base attempts to at least the above average range next season. Macro-level, the team was less aggressive than I thought. They were the sixth fastest team on my weighted average sprint speed sheet. And they had five players who ran less than their sprint speed may imply. The large number of Diamondbacks attempting to steal at a high rate seems to be due to their roster construction rather than organizational tendencies. I.e. their roster was littered with above average sprint speed players.
Boston Red Sox – I would classify the Red Sox as somewhat aggressive. They were willing to send three above average runners, Benintendi, Betts, and Nunez at well above average rates. They were also “sneaky aggressive” in the sense they sent below average runners Vazquez and Chris Young at above average rates. They should consider sending Bogaerts more often. Not only does his speed indicate he is capable of it, he was only caught stealing once in 16 attempts (94% success rate).
Cincinnati Reds – How does a team with the fourth highest stolen base attempt rate (shown in first table) have only three runners attempt steals at an above average rate? Billy f****** Hamilton. That’s how. He attempted steals an absurd 33.33% of the time in his 216 stolen base opportunities last year. Simply silly. I want to know how many of his attempts included pitch outs. Billy (yes we are on a first name basis) and to a lesser degree Jose Peraza were complete anomalies on this list, and their rates heavily skewed the Reds data. Cincinnati as a whole is firmly in the non-aggressive bucket.
Los Angeles Angels – The Angels table was revealing. All of their eight fastest runners attempted more steals than their speed may suggest. None of their 11 slowest runners attempted more steals than expected. This helps to explain how they could simultaneously attempt the steals at the highest rate while having the second slowest roster. In essence, they were selectively aggressive, stealing more often than expected with above average runners and making little to no effort with below average runners. On a player level, I found it surprising that neither Cameron Maybin nor Ben Revere cleared the plus threshold for sprint speed (1 STD > AVE). However! (S.A.S. voice) They attempted steals at an elite rate (3 STD > AVE).
Milwaukee Brewers – This is a run happy team. Seven players ran more than expected based on their sprint speed, two of whom, Ryan Braun and Domingo Santana sported average or worse sprint speed. Jonathan Villar attempted steals three STDs over the league average rate with merely above average sprint speed.
Texas Rangers – Perhaps the most aggressive team in MLB, they sent some below average runners at above average rates, and they sent above average runners at well above average rates. Delino Deshields was their only real burner, but that didn’t stop them from sending eight other players at an above average rate, which was the second most in the league. (Shown in the second table, first column)
For fantasy players it would be wise to keep an eye on offseason acquisitions by the Rangers, Brewers, and Angels. These players are liable to see increase in their stolen bases in 2018. To what degree? This will be tackled in a future post. Also on tap, who were the least aggressive teams and what we can learn from their data?
A few notes on the information from the slide show:
*Many Detailed Statistics are based on play-by-play accounts accumulated by RetroSheet. These totals may be incomplete – (Copied verbatim from Baseball Reference). This is referring to the asterisks next to player names.
**No players in the sprint speed data set are greater than three standard deviations from the mean. That does not mean Buxton, Hamilton etc. are not 80 runners on the scouting scale. It just means the distribution for sprint speeds does not follow a normal curve.
***Not every player was available on the Sprint Speed Leaderboard, limiting our sample to 451, which is why the average SB Att% of 5.01% differs from the overall league at 5.17%.
AFL Notes 11/13/17
Kyle Regnault (LHP) New York Mets – Left-handed command specialist is the best four-word phrase I could come up with to describe Regnault. His fastball is not overpowering, but it can be effective due to his array of secondary offerings. He can run the fastball arm side in on the hands of right-handed hitters or straighten it. Regnault’s best pitch is a high 70s curveball with two plane movement and hefty depth. He’ll throw it either at the bottom of the zone or as a chase pitch. The curve gets a lot of swing and miss. Regnault also employs a low 80s slider. It’s not as good as the curve, but it serves as an effective change of pace. The fourth option is a low 80s changeup that has moderate depth and fade. He seemed to reserve this pitch for lefties and would run it away from them. Regnault’s overall arsenal works because he is able to command all four offerings and keep them down in the zone. I think he is polished and ready for a shot at middle relief in the majors.
AFL Notes 11/11/17
Adam Choplick (LHP) Texas Rangers – After losing out to Hafþór Júlíus Björnsson in the casting process for Game of Thrones’ “The Moutain”, Choplick resorted to his backup plan, a baseball career. He is a massive human, listed at 6’9” 250. With his colossal frame and long arms, one might expect natural plus extension, but his use of a high three-quarters arm slot undermines it. On the other hand, his height and arm slot allow Choplick to pitch with significant downhill plane. I can see this having divergent effects on his fastball and curveball. His high 70s curveball already has quality depth, which is augmented by the plane. Hitters should swing over the top or make contact on the top of the ball, meaning lots of ground balls. Alternatively, plane on his 92-95 mph fastball should result in fly balls. I think hitters will gauge its downward angle and respond with an upward-sloping bat path, allowing them to keep their bat in the zone longer. The uppercut path should result in more fly balls.
The curveball has been Choplick’s most-used secondary offering, and he commands it well. I think the command combined with its aforementioned depth make it a plus pitch. His slider was serviceable but below average. Choplick used it inside to jam right-handed hitters. Choplick has posted excellent numbers in the minors but has also been older than league averages. Next season he will be more age-appropriate in the Texas League, which should be revealing. Overall, Choplick looks like a pen piece. I think the stuff falls short of a closer profile, but middle relief or setup are possible outcomes.